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HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS
As  the field of homeland  defense and 
security expands  and matures, the 
c o n t r i b u t i o n s  f r o m v a r i o u s 
disciplines  become ever more 
important. Particularly exciting are 
technical advances that have real-
world application to homeland 
security practices. For this  reason, 
Homeland Security Affairs  is pleased 
to partner, for the third year, with 
the IEEE in  presenting the best 
papers  from  the Conference on 
Technologies for Homeland Security.
The 2012 HST Conference drew 
attendees from  federal agencies, 
universities, national laboratories, 
federally funded research and 
d e v e l o p m e n t c e n t e r s , s m a l l 
businesses, and industry. Peer-
reviewed technical papers  were 
o r g a n i z e d a l o n g f o u r t r a c k s 
highlighting  emerging technologies 
in  the areas of (1) cyber security; (2) 
attack  and disaster preparation, 
recovery, and response; (3) land and 
maritime  border security; and  (4) 
biometric  and forensics. One  paper 
from each  of these  tracks  was 
selected as  the “best paper”; a fifth 
paper was  awarded as the  “best 
paper” from  the  conference  as a 
whole. 
The practical application of the 
technological innovations  presented 
in  these  papers  adds  to the overall 
strength  of homeland security 
efforts. As always, we welcome your 
c o m m e n t s  a n d o p i n i o n s  a t 
www.hsaj.org.
Notes From The Editor
Homeland Security Affairs  is proud to publish the best  papers from  the IEEE 2012  Conference 
on Technology for Homeland Security.
The award for  best conference paper  overall went  to “A  Compressed Sensing Approach  for 
Detection of Explosive Threats at  Standoff Distances using a  Passive Array of 
Scatterers,” by  Jose Angel Martinez-Lorenzo and others. Addressing  an  important real-world 
problem, the research  described in  this paper applies millimeter  wave radar  imaging  to find 
threats concealed under  clothing  at  standoff distances up to fifty  meters. Using  a  passive array  of 
scatters in  the target  zone, compressive sensing can be used to linearize  an  otherwise difficult 
nonlinear  problem.  The result  is an  imaging  algorithm  used to achieve a  resolution  of 7.5  mm  at 
60 GHz which  can  accurately  reconstruct  the reflectivity  values of both  weak dielectric 
scatterers, such  as explosives, including  Tri-Nitro-Toluene (TNT), and strong  scatters,  like 
metallic  pipes.  The authors present a  clever  approach with  good theoretical explanation, 
reasonable CONOPS and numerical validation.
The conference also awarded papers in  four  specific tracks: Cyber  Security; Attack and Disaster 
Preparation,  Recovery,  and Response; Land and Maritime Border  Security; and Biometrics and 
Forensics.
In the Cyber Security  track, the award for  best  paper  went  to “Return-Oriented 
Vulnerabilities in  ARM Executables,” by  Zi-Shun Huang  and Ian G. Harris. This paper 
presents a  virus-scan  approach  to detect  code sequences that  can  result  in  stack-smashing 
attacks on  ARM devices. The work extends previous work on  an important  topic in  special 
purpose static analysis techniques.
Lance Fiondella  and others received the award for  best paper in  the Attack and Disaster 
Preparation,  Recovery, and Response track for  “Security  and Performance Analysis of 
Passenger Screening for Mass-transit.” This paper  addresses an  important modern 
problem: that of deciding  when and how  much  security  is appropriate at mass transit  terminals 
(i.e.,  the metro,  rail,  and bus stations). The authors recognize a  fundamental tradeoff between 
security  and terminal productivity  (from  delays, costs), and apply  it  to a  specific  terminal  to 
demonstrate its analytic-effectiveness. They  then  describe how  this method can  drive policy 
decisions as well as research investments.
In  the Land and Maritime Border  Security  Track, the award for  best  paper  went  to “Intelligent 
Radiation Sensor System  (IRSS) Advanced Technology  Demonstrator (ATD),” by 
Daniel  Cooper  and others. The paper  describes spectroscopic  radiation detectors designed to 
improve the detection,  localization,  and identification of potential radiological  threats, 
presenting a significant  multi-year  end-to-end field technology  demonstration  of short-range 
radiological sensor  network.  The system  is primarily  targeted to situations where it  is not 
feasible to direct  traffic  through  portal radiation detection systems, e.g.  large events,  search 
team  objectives,  etc. The capability  to intelligently  network individual portable detectors and 
fuse their  data  using  advanced algorithms and COTS hardware has been shown  within this 
program  to significantly  increase the effectiveness of an assortment  of portable radiation 
detectors in a variety of naturally occurring backgrounds.
“A  Video-based Hyper-focal  Imaging Method for  Iris Recognition in  the Visible 
Spectrum,” by  Sriram  Tankasala and others was recognized as the best paper in  the 
Biometrics and Forensics track.  The authors create a visible-wavelength  iris imaging  system  and 
test  it  on  46  volunteers imaged under  highly  controlled conditions at  a  45-minute interval. 
Using  a  freely  available comparison package, ROCs for  left  and right irises are developed for 
both  the hyperfocal and single frame images showing the performance improvement for  the 
hyperfocal method.
We would like to thank the IEEE for the opportunity  to publish  this important research  in 
Homeland Security Affairs.
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Abstract—This work presents a new radar system concept,
working at millimeter wave frequencies, capable of de-
tecting explosive related threats at standoff distances. The
system consists of a two dimensional aperture of randomly
distributed transmitting/receiving antenna elements, and a
Passive Array of Scatters (PAS) positioned in the vicinity
of the target. In addition, a novel norm one minimization
imaging algorithm has been implemented that is capable
of producing super-resolution images. This paper also
includes a numerical example in which 7.5 mm resolution
is achieved at the standoff range of 40 m for a working
frequency of 60 GHz.
Index Terms—radar, compressive sensing, millimeter
wave imaging.
I. INTRODUCTION
DURING the last decade, new systems based onMillimeter-Wave-Radar technology have been de-
ployed on airport checkpoints all around the world [1].
Millimeter wave systems are preferred to X-ray systems
[2]-[4], for this particular application, because the former
do not use ionizing radiation. These systems have been
proved to be successful on finding explosives concealed
underclothing; the success of this technology is mainly
due to the short range between the sensing components
of the system and the person under test. A new important
challenge arises when the same technology is desired
for threat detection at standoff distances [5]-[8], which
include ranges running between ten to fifty meters.
In this work, a novel configuration based on an array
of randomly distributed transmitting/receiving antennas,
located on a two dimensional aperture, is used to scan
a person at standoff distances. In order to improve
the resolution of the radar system, a Passive Array of
Scatters (PAS) is also placed near the target region.
Under this configuration, the non-linear imaging problem
can be linearized if the field produced by the two dimen-
sional array and the PAS is accurately known across the
imaging region. As a result, the imaging problem can
be written into a matrix form. The sensing matrix, with
coefficients representing the propagation from the target
to the sensor establishes the linear relationship between
the reflectivity value of a pixel on the target and the field
measured on the array of receivers. For the particular
case in which the number of pixels in the image is much
larger than the number of sensors, the sensing matrix
may become singular and difficult to invert.
A new approach, based on compressive sensing [9]-
[16], can be used to invert the matrix if two conditions
are satisfied: 1) the image can be represented by a
sparse representation of customized basis functions; and
2) the sensing matrix complies with the mathematical
Restricted Isometric Property (RIP) condition. If both
conditions are satisfied, the image can be reconstructed
by solving a convex problem.
This paper shows how this imaging algorithm has been
used to achieve a resolution of 1.5 wavelengths, or 7.5
mm at 60 GHz. The proposed algorithm can accurately
reconstruct the reflectivity values of both weak dielec-
tric scatterers, such as explosives, including Tri-Nitro-
Toluene (TNT), and strong scatters, like metallic pipes,
concealed under clothing.
II. SYSTEM CONFIGURATION
A. System Concept of operation
The proposed system configuration is shown sche-
matically in Fig. 1. It is composed of an inexpensive,
high-resolution radar system that can distinguish foreign
1
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2objects hidden on individuals at a distance, and that can
still fit in or on a van. Additionally, a PAS is placed
between the radar and the person under test in order
to be able to achieve a super-resolution radar system.
The concept of using multiple PAS over an imposed
trajectory (see Fig.1 (b)) for person movement in places
like airport terminals or bus stations provides the system
with the option of re-configurability so that it might be
applicable to indoor scenarios at multiple ranges.
B. System parameters
Fig. 2 represents a top view of the configuration and
parameters of the system. The blue dots, on the left,
represent the positions of the transmitting and receiving
antennas. The radar is located on a square aperture of
width L1, and the total number of transmitting/receiving
antennas is na. The orange dots, at the center of the
image, represent the positions of the elements composing
the PAS. The PAS is also located on a square aperture
of width L2, and the total number of elements on the
PAS is nd. The person under test is represented by the
red silhouette on the right; and the reconstruction is per-
formed by the imaging algorithm on a two dimensional
plane, represented by a red line in Fig. 2, located in front
of the person under test with np pixels. The distance
between the radar and the person under test is Z0, and
the distance between the PAS and the person under test
is Z2. The resolution of the radar system, which is equal
to the pixel size of the reconstructed image, is indicated
by the parameter l.
III. MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION FOR THE
IMAGING PROBLEM
A. Sensing matrix
In this particular work, the sensing matrix, used by
the imaging algorithm, is computed by using the phase
term associated with an electromagnetic wave traveling
as follows: 1) from each one of the transmitting antennas
to each one of the scatters in the PAS; 2) from each one
of the scatters on the PAS to each pixel on reconstruction
plane; 3) from each pixel on the reconstruction plane
to each one of the scatters on the PAS; and 4) from
each one of the scatters on the PAS to each receiving
antenna. This approximation is based on the following
assumptions: 1) the amplitude attenuation associated
with the electromagnetic wave propagation is considered
to be constant, since it’s impact on the quality of the
reconstructed image is negligible; 2) the mutual coupling
among pixels in the reconstructed image is not taken
into account; 3) the amplitude and phase of the induced
currents on the reconstruction plane is proportional to
the incident field produced by radar illumination the
(a)
(b)
Fig. 1. (a) General sketch of our van-based, high resolution radar
system for standoff detection of potential suicide bombers. (b) Top
view of the multiple-range concept of operation.
Fig. 2. Top view of the radar configuration. The blue circles on
the left represent an thinned array of transmitter/receiver antennas;
the orange dots on the center represent the passive array of scatters,
which randomly redirect the energy of the radar towards the target; the
person under test (target) is represented by the red silhouette on the
right, and the two dimensional plane over which the reconstruction is
implemented is represented by the red line in front of the person under
test.
latter approximation is equivalent to traditional Physical
Optics method.
The system works on a multiple mono-static configu-
ration, in which each element of the array transmits and
receives on different slots of time without interacting
with the radiation of other elements in the array.
Under this configuration, the sensing matrix A es-
tablishes a linear relationship between the unknown
complex reflectivity vector x ∈ Cnp and the measured
complex field data y ∈ Cnd . This relationship can be
expressed in a matrix form as follows:
A · x+ n = y (1)
where n ∈ Cnd represents the noise collected by each
receiving antenna. The matrix A can be rewritten as
2
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3the product of two matrices: 1) Eb, which is a di-
agonal matrix accounting for the background incident
field produced by a single transmitting/receiving antenna
and PAS on the reconstruction plane; and 2) P , which
is a full matrix accounting for the propagation from
each point on the reconstruction plane to each trans-
mitting/receiving antenna after passing though the PAS.
After applying some algebraic operations, the coeffi-









where k is the free space wave number; ri is a vector
indicating the position of the i-th transmitting/receiving
antenna; r′j is a vector indicating the position of the
j-th pixel in the reconstruction plane; and r′′p is a vector
indicating the position of p-th scatter in the PAS.
B. Imaging algorithm using compressive sensing
approach
The proposed radar system is designed in accordance
with the compressive sensing theory [9]-[16]. In order
to apply such principles for standoff detection of ex-
plosive related-threats, certain mathematical conditions
must be satisfied by the sensing matrix A and the
reconstructed reflectivity image x. These conditions can
be summarized as follows [13]: 1) the sensing matrix
must satisfy the Restricted-Isometry-Property condition,
which is related to the independency of the columns
of the matrix; and 2) the unknown reflectivity vector
must accept a sparse representation as a solution, which
related to the number of non-zero entries on the solution
vector. The parameters of the systems can be modified
until these two conditions are satisfied; the optimized
parameters include the following: aperture length of
the radar, aperture length of the PAS, resolution in
the reconstruction plane, number of antennas on the
radar aperture, number of scatters in the PAS, working
frequency, separation between the radar and the PAS,
separation between the PAS and the target. In this work,
this optimization is done manually, but it is expected
that in further research contributions such optimization
process should be automatized.
If the two aforementioned conditions are satisfied,
then the reconstruction of the unknown vector can be
performed with a small number of measurements (trans-
mitting/receiving antennas) by solving the following
convex problem [15]:
min ‖x‖1 s.t. Ax = y (3)
where ‖x‖1 represents the norm-one of the vector x.
In the particular case where x is not sparse, the problem
can still be solved if one can find a discretized functional
W , in which a sparse representation xp of the unknown
vector x can be found through the following relation-
ship: xp = Wx. Therefore, the “Compressive Sensing”
problem can be now solved by the following problem:
min ‖Wx‖1 s.t. Ax = y (4)
A Total Variation (TV) functional W is used in this
particular work [15]. The TV functional W computes
and adds the two directional gradients of the image x
for each pixel; thus achieving a sparse representation xp
of the original image x.
IV. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
A. Radar configuration
The imaging principles described in the previous sec-
tion are evaluated on two different scenarios (see Table
I): configuration #1, in which the distance between the
radar and person under test is ten meters; and configu-
ration #2, in which the distance between the radar and
person under test is forty meters. Table I also summarizes
all the parameters used for the numerical simulations. It
is important to realize that in order to increase the range
by a factor of four, from ten to forty meters, the length of
the radar aperture must also be increased by a factor of
four, and the number of antennas in such aperture must
also be increased by a 60% factor, from five to eight
hundred. The size and the number of scatters of the PAS
is the same for both configurations, leading to the same
system resolution of 7.5 millimeters. For the simulations
in this work, a uniform white noise of 25 dB of signal
to noise ratio is considered; and the working frequency
of the system is 60 GHz.
PARAMETER CONFIG. #1 CONFIG. #2
Z0 2000λ = 10 m 8000λ = 40 m
Z2 250λ = 1.25 m 250λ = 1.25 m
L1 80λ = .4 m 320λ = 1.6 m
L2 250λ = 1.25 m 250λ = 1.25 m
na 500 800
nd 1000 1000
l 7.5 mm 7.5 mm
TABLE I
PARAMETERS FOR THE NUMERICAL EXAMPLES.
B. Target specifications
In order to test the feasibility of the system, a projec-
tion into a two dimensional plane of the three dimen-
sional geometry, –a person with attached explosives– is
3
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4used as ground truth for the imaging algorithm. This
two dimensional simplification of the three dimensional
problem allows for a fast reconstruction using only one
frequency for the radar configuration, and its extension
to the three dimensional problem can be easily imple-
mented in the future.
Fig. 3 (a) shows the two dimensional projection of a
person under test; and Fig. 3 (b) shows the same person
with two different types of explosive stimulants: two
vertical metallic pipes of high reflectivity, and one square
made of TNT of low dielectric reflectivity. The colorbar
in the image indicate the absolute value of the reflectivity
divided by the average reflectivity on the whole image.
(a)
(b)
Fig. 3. Projection of the person under test used as ground truth by the
imaging algorithm: (a) no-threat case, (b) threat case composed of two
metallic pipes with high reflectivity and TNT square of low dielectric
reflectivity.
C. Reconstruction results
Fig. 4 (a) and (b) show the reconstructed image when
traditional Fourier-based SAR techniques [1] are used
for the case of a person without and with explosive
stimulants located at ten meters from the radar system
(Configuration #1). This algorithm did not use the PAS;
and, therefore, the resolution of the system is limited to
that of the radar aperture. The quality of the reconstruc-
tion is quite deficient, and it is very difficult to discern
the threat from the no-treat cases. Only an amplitude-
based algorithm could be used to distinguish between the
cases. The threat case, containing metallic pipes, shows




Fig. 4. Reconstruction using traditional Fourier-based SAR algorithms
for configuration #1: (a) no-threat case, and (b) threat case.
When the PAS is introduced and the norm-one mini-
mization is used for the imaging algorithm, the quality
4
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5of the reconstructed images, for both threat and no-
threat cases, is substantially improved when compared to
those produced by traditional SAR imaging algorithms
[17][18] as it can be seen on Fig. 5 (a)-(b).
Fig. 5 (c) shows the reconstructed image for configu-
ration #2, in which the radar and the target are separated
40 meters, when the PAS and the norm-one minimization
on the imaging algorithm are used. Standoff detection at
40 meters requires that the length of the square radar
aperture be increased from 0.4 meters to 1.6 meters,
and the number of transmitting/receiving antennas is also
increased from 500 to 800. This upgraded version of
the system is capable of producing a resolution of 7.5
millimeters at 40 meters range.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper describes a new millimeter wave imaging
system, which is able to produce super resolution images
at standoff distances. Unlike traditional imaging systems
in which the radar system directly illuminates the target
under test, this system illuminates a passive array of
scatters that redirects the energy of the radar towards the
person under test. The PAS can be seen as a magnifica-
tion lens that is located in front of the target, producing
a super-resolution image. The imaging algorithm used
for this system is based on compressive sensing theory.
This imaging algorithm is different than traditional SAR
algorithms because instead of just performing a Fourier
transform of the measured data, it solves a norm-one
minimization problem. Another important feature of this
system is that it can be configured to work at multiple
ranges if a specified trajectory is imposed on the person
under test, making this system well suited for deploy-
ment for indoor spaces such as airport terminals or bus
stations.
The performance of the system in terms of quality of
the reconstructed image was tested for two target range
configurations 10 and 40 m. In both cases, the system
produced a resolution of 7.5 mm. The same PAS was
used for both configurations, but it was necessary to
increase the size of the radar aperture for the farther
case to achieve the required 7.5 mm resolution.
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Fig. 5. Reconstruction using compressive sensing and the passive
array of scatters: (a) no-threat case in configuration #1, (b) threat case
in configuration #1, and (c) threat case in configuration #2.
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Abstract
Return-oriented programming is a method of com-
puter exploit technique which is growing in popular-
ity among attackers because it enables the remote ex-
ecution of arbitrary code without the need for code
injection. Return-to-LibC (Ret2LibC) is the most
common return-oriented attack in use today, allow-
ing an attacker to leverage control of the stack to
execute common library functions which are already
present on the target system, such as LibC. ARM-
based processors, commonly used in embedded sys-
tems, are not directly vulnerable to Ret2LibC at-
tacks because function arguments in the ARM are
passed through registers rather than the stack. In
2011 Itzhak Avraham presented a new Return-to-
Zero-Protection (Ret2ZP) attack against ARM pro-
cessors which enables the same control as a Ret2LibC
attack.
Our research contribution is to provide a formal
deﬁnition of the Ret2ZP attack and to deﬁne an al-
gorithm to detect vulnerabilities to Ret2ZP in ARM
executables. Our algorithm for detecting vulnerabili-
ties can be used to screen executables for vulnerabil-
ities before they are deployed.
1 Introduction
Within the past 15 to 20 years embedded sys-
tems have seen increasingly widespread adoption.
The complexity of many embedded devices is ef-
fectively invisible to users, operating inside compo-
nents used everyday including automobiles, televi-
sions, and video game consoles. The research ﬁrm
IDC reports the market for embedded computer sys-
tems already generates more than US 1 trillion in
revenue annually and will double in size over the
next four years [20]. IDC also predicts that much of
this growth will be propelled by more sophisticated,
cloud-connected embedded system which will have a
high degree of network connectivity. The embedded
nature of these systems successfully conceals com-
plexity, allowing users to forget about security vul-
nerabilities that they are exposed to. The media has
improved public awareness of cyberattacks against
servers operating at institutions such as banks, credit
card agencies, and nuclear material enrichment facili-
ties. However, people are not suﬃciently aware of the
vulnerabilities inside embedded devices which they
use much more frequently. Embedded systems are
increasingly network-enabled, typically connected to
the internet through a TCP/IP stack. Network con-
nectivity makes these systems vulnerable to many of
the same cyberattacks as desktop, laptop, and server
machines.
Malware is a collection of instructions that exe-
cutes on a machine and make the system to perform
somemalicious operation [4]. There are several recent
examples of malware which targets embedded de-
vices. For example, millions of printers were found to
contain a security weakness that could allow attack-
ers to take control of the systems, steal data and issue
commands that could cause the devices to overheat
and catch ﬁre [10]. Even in industrial systems such
as programmable logic controller (PLC) and supervi-
sory control and data acquisition (SCADA) have the
risk to be attacked. The Stuxnet worm, discovered in
June 2010, initially spreads via Microsoft Windows,
and targets Siemens industrial software and equip-
ment [13]. Embedded systems are often required to
meet strict timing, cost, and power requirements. As
a result, traditional defense mechanisms are not suit-
able for embedded systems. Security vulnerabilities
often depend on very speciﬁc aspects of the behavior
the underlying processor, so embedded systems vul-
nerabilities may be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from those
of general-purpose platforms.
Return-oriented programming [24] describes a
growing class of exploits which code segments already
present on a system to execute a range of malicious
behaviors. The most common type of return-oriented
1
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attack is Return-to-LibC (Ret2LibC) [8] where an at-
tacker exploits a buﬀer overﬂow to redirect control
ﬂow to a library function already present in the sys-
tem. To perform a Ret2LibC attack, the attacker
must overwrite a return address on the stack with
the address of a library function. Additionally, the
attacker must place the arguments of the library func-
tion on the stack in order to control the execution
of the library function. Ret2LibC is commonly ap-
plied against Intel x86 architectures, but the ARM
architectures [17] used in embedded systems are not
directly vulnerable to this attack because function pa-
rameters are passed through registers instead. ARM-
based processors are the most commonly used micro-
processors in embedded systems due in part to their
low power consumption compared to Intel x86.
At the BlackHat Convention in 2011, Itzhak Avra-
ham [6] ﬁrst presented the Return-to-Zero-Protection
(Ret2ZP) attack which eﬀectively allows a Ret2LibC
attack to be applied to ARM-based processors. This
is an important development because reveals a signif-
icant vulnerability in ARM-based processors which is
likely to be exploited to create malware targeted at
embedded systems.
The contribution of this paper is an approach and
a tool to analyze the software on an ARM-based sys-
tem and determine whether or not it is vulnerable to
a Ret2ZP attack. The feasibility of a Ret2ZP attack
depends on the existence of special code sequences
on the embedded system platform. We deﬁne the na-
ture of the code sequences which expose a system to
a Ret2ZP attack. Our tool automatically scans an
existing ARM executable and identiﬁes all vulnera-
ble code sequences. Once identiﬁed, vulnerable code
sequences can be patched to remove the vulnerability.
2 Related Work
Return-to-LibC (Ret2LibC) [11] is a method of ex-
ploiting based on buﬀer overﬂow to defeat a sys-
tem that has a non-executable stack. The diﬀer-
ence between Ret2LibC and traditional buﬀer over-
ﬂow code inject attack is that the return address
is overwritten to point to a shared library such as
C library. In addition, the required arguments to
the shared library function are also placed on the
stack. This allows attackers to call existing library
functions without injecting malicious code into a pro-
gram. Dynamic shared libraries must be executable,
so non-executable memory regions provide no protec-
tion against this attack. Ret2LibC is a special case
of a return-oriented programming attack [24] which
has the potential to enable arbitrary code execution.
To prevent Ret2LibC attacks, many mechanisms
have conceived. One protection technique focuses on
monitoring control ﬂow and memory activities to de-
tect violations [23]. These approaches may use hard-
ware support [14, 5, 19, 25] such as a shadow stack.
These methods require a new architecture [15, 7], and
may aﬀect the original pipeline performance [16, 3].
This techniques need to check all instructions, mem-
ory, or stack. If it does not check all instruction, the
risk of attack is possible. Checking all instruction
comes with a signiﬁcant reduction in performance
[21, 12, 9]. Protected free-branch instructions tech-
nique can be implemented by using code rewriting
techniques to remove all unaligned instructions that
can be used to link the gadgets. However, because
of code rewriting, its main disadvantage is code size
increase [22].
Ret2LibC attack requires passing arguments to libc
functions from the stack. By ARM calling conven-
tion [17], passing parameters occurs through regis-
ters rather than the stack. A stack buﬀer overﬂow
gives the attacker direct control of the stack, but not
the registers. As a result, Ret2LibC attacks does not
work againstARM-based processors. In [6], Avraham
developed the Return-to-Zero-Protection (Ret2ZP)
attack against ARM-based processors which allows
an attacker to control registers from the stack. By
allowing control of registers, Ret2ZP enables the
Ret2LibC attack to be applied to ARM-based pro-
cessors.
3 Return to Zero Protection
(Ret2ZP)
A Ret2ZP attack exploits a stack buﬀer overﬂow to
redirect control ﬂow to a function present on the sys-
tem, and to control the arguments to that function.
Redirecting control ﬂow can be performed directly
by overwriting a return address on the stack with the
address of the desired function. However, control-
ling the function arguments is more diﬃcult because
functions executing on the ARM architecture accept
arguments through argument registers r0 - r3, rather
than the stack. To control the arguments to a func-
tion, the contents of one or more of these registers
must be assigned before control ﬂow is redirected to
the desired function.
To control the values of the argument registers and
to redirect control ﬂow to the desired function, the
Ret2ZP attack depends on the existence of a vul-
nerable code sequence (VCS), already present on
the system, which copies data from the stack to the
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argument registers, and then from the stack to the
program counter (PC) register. The Ret2ZP attack
ﬁrst places the library function arguments and the li-
brary function address onto the stack. Then control
ﬂow is redirected to the VCS which moves the argu-
ments from the stack to the argument registers, and
moves the library function address from the stack to
the PC, redirecting control ﬂow to the library func-
tion.
Figures 1a, b, and c show the contents of the stack
at diﬀerent points during the execution of a Ret2ZP
attack. Figure 1a shows the contents of the original
stack, before the attack has been executed. Two stack
frames are shown, where stack frame 0 is the current
stack frame at the top of the stack. The stack frames
have been simpliﬁed for the purposes of this presen-
tation, so only the contents important to the Ret2ZP
attack are shown. Each stack frame contains a space
labeled locals for local variables for the corresponding
function, and a space labeled ret addr which contains
the return address for code execution after the cor-
responding function is complete. The current stack
frame contains a buﬀer labeled buﬀ which we assume
is vulnerable to buﬀer overﬂow by the attack.
Figure 1b shows the contents of the stack after the
buﬀer overﬂow. The stack grows down in memory
addresses, so the memory addresses increase down
in the stack pictures of Figure 1. When the buﬀer
overﬂows, the stack below the buﬀer is altered, as
can be seen in Figure 1b. The buﬀer overﬂow places
three diﬀerent blocks of data onto the stack. The
address of the VCS, &VCS, is written over the old
return address so that the the VCS will be executed
when the current function completes. The arguments
to be passed to the desired library function, args, and
the address of the desired library function, &libfn are
placed on the stack.
Figure 1c shows the contents of the stack after the
current function completes its execution and returns.
Since the old return address was overwritten with
&VCS, the VCS is now executing. The locals region
for stack frame 0 was popped oﬀ of the stack when
the previous function completed its execution, so the
top of the stack contains the arguments for the de-
sired library function and the address of the library
function, as shown in Figure 1c. At this point, it is
the job of the VCS to move the arguments from the
stack to the argument registers, and move &libfn to
the PC.
3.1 Vulnerable Code Sequence (VCS)
The Ret2ZP attack depends on the existence of an
appropriate VCS in the system. A VCS, is a consec-
utive sequence of instructions which are resident in
the memory of the victim machine. It would be pos-
sible for a vulnerable code sequence to be composed
of multiple discontinuous code sequences which are
connected by intervening jump instructions but we
ignore this possibility for the sake of simplicity, and
because it is unlikely to occur in practice. Any valid
VCS must satisfy the following set of constraints that
our tool checks for.
1. The ﬁnal instruction in the sequence must copy
data from the stack to the PC register. The ex-
ecution of this ﬁnal instruction which transfers
control to the desired library function.
2. The sequence must contain no instruction which
writes data to the PC register, other than the
ﬁnal instruction. This constraint ensures that
the instruction sequence is continuous.
3. The sequence must move data from the stack
into some subset of the argument registers.
4. The sequence must not write data to the stack.
This is required because any data written to the
stack might overwrite the library function argu-
ments or the library function address which are
already on the stack.
Figure 2 shows an example of a VCS. The ﬁrst line
of code loads argument registers r0 and r1 from the
stack which is addressed by the stack pointer, SP.
The ﬁnal line of code executes a function return by
popping the top of the stack and placing the popped
value in the program counter, PC. Notice that the
stack contents can be read using a load-type of in-
struction such as ldm, or a pop instruction which also
updates the stack pointer.
4 VCS Detection
We have implemented a tool which identiﬁes the pres-
ence of vulnerable code sequences in an executable.
Detection of these sequences will allow the software
to be patched, removing the vulnerability before the
software is deployed. In order to analyze the exe-
cutable, our tool uses the Radare toolkit [1] to dis-
assemble the executable and generate assembly code
which we can process. Once the executable is disas-
sembled, our tool performs a single-pass scan of each
instruction to identify any VCS.
An important aspect of a VCS is that it must move
data from the stack into the argument registers. To
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Figure 1: Stack contents during Ret2ZP attack, (a) before buﬀer overﬂow, (b) after buﬀer overﬂow, (c)start
of VCS execution
ldm sp, {r0, r1}
add sp, sp, #8
pop {pc}
Figure 2: Vulnerable code sequence example
assist our discussion of this topic, we refer to a regis-
ter as being stack-controllable at a point during pro-
gram execution if the current value of the register
was copied directly from the stack. A register be-
comes stack-controllable when an instruction loads
stack contents into the register, and it is no longer
controllable after the registers value is modiﬁed in
any way, other than loading it from the stack.
The executable is scanned linearly from beginning
to end, and at each line a set of stack-controllable ar-
gument registers R is maintained. A VCS is detected
if an instruction is encountered which loads the PC
from the stack, and R = ∅. Additional constraints
are that the VCS should contain no branches to any
address not taken from the stack, and that no in-
struction within the VCS should write to the stack.
To enforce these constraints we set R = ∅ whenever
either a non-stack branch or a write to the stack are
encountered.
Figure 3 contains the pseudocode describing our
VCS detection algorithm. In the pseudocode we use
the following deﬁnitions:
• A is the set of argument registers.
• PC refers to the program counter register.
• R is the current set of stack-controllable argu-
ment registers.
• I is the ordered sequence of instructions in the
executable.
1. R = ∅
2. foreach i ∈ I
3. foreach r ∈ A
4. if i ∈ Lr then R = R ∪ r
5. if i ∈Mr then R = R− r
6. if (i ∈ W ) OR (i ∈ B) then R = ∅
7. if i ∈ LPC AND R = ∅ then
8. print VCS Detected
9. R = ∅
Figure 3: VCS Detection Pseudocode
• Lr is the set of instructions in the executable
which load register r from the stack.
• Mr is the set of instructions in the executable
which modify register r without loading register
r from the stack.
• W is the set of instructions in the executable
which write data to the stack.
• B is the set of instructions in the executable
which branch to an address not taken from the
stack.
The algorithm in Figure 3 initializes the set of
stack-controllable registers on line 1, and enters a
loop starting on line 2 which iteratively processes
each instruction of the executable. The set of stack-
controllable registers is updated on lines 3 - 5 where
an argument register is added to the set if it is loaded
from the stack, and deleted from the set if it is mod-
iﬁed. A check for non-stack branch instructions and
stack writing instructions is performed on line 6. The
end of a VCS is detected at line 7 as an instruc-
tion which moves the stack contents to the PC while
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File Name C exec. # VCS
aes expanded key 508 28878 1
aes set key 481 27449 1
Bitband 515 25151 0
boot demo1 491 32923 0
boot demo2 510 34313 0
boot demo eth 529 67360 0
enet io 1234 66532 0
enet lwip 741 66627 0
enet ptpd 1095 66621 1
enet uip 690 62218 0
hello 539 36919 0
gpio jtag 543 62218 0
Graphics 719 24014 0
interrupts 616 29175 0
mpu fault 563 31472 0
Pwmgen 470 24623 1
qs ek-lm3s6965 5178 66726 0
sd card 731 62332 0
timers 497 26462 0
uart echo 515 30110 0
Watchdog 476 25338 0
Table 1: VCS Detection Results
R = ∅. If a VCS is detected then success is announced
(line 8) and the stack-controllable set is reset to start
scanning for a new VCS in the remainder of the exe-
cutable (line 9).
5 Experimental Results
We used our vulnerability analysis tool to detect vul-
nerable code segments in a set of same ARM executa-
bles. As our benchmark set of ARM executables we
used the example programs provided for use with the
EK-LM3S6965 Evaluation Board from Texas Instru-
ments [2]. The board uses an ARM-based TI Stellaris
LM3S6965 microprocessor. The sample programs are
provided in C which we compiled for the LM3S6965
processor using the GCC compiler [18].
Table 1 shows the results of our analysis of all of
the sample ARM-executables. Each row contains the
results for a diﬀerent program and the ﬁrst column
contains the name of the program. The second and
third columns show the size of the original C pro-
grams and the size of the compiled executable. The
ﬁnal column labeled # VCS shows the number of
vulnerable code segments found in each executable.
The table shows that almost 20% of these executa-
ldmibeq sp!, {r0, r1, r2, r4, r5, r6,
r7, fp, sp, pc}
Figure 4: VCS example in Pwmgen
bles contained a vulnerability to the Ret2ZP attack.
The total CPU time required to detect VCS in all
examples is 0.117 seconds.
The vulnerable code sequences detected in these
examples were all comprised of a single line of code
which loaded the argument registers as well as the
PC. An example is shown in Figure 4 which was found
in the Pwmgen sample program.
6 Conclusions
We have developed a tool which is used to detect
Ret2ZP vulnerabilities in ARM executables. The
popularity of return-oriented programming attacks
underscores the need for the tool that we have de-
veloped. Our experimental results show that almost
20% of the programs that we evaluated actually con-
tained vulnerabilities. Since the frequency of vulnera-
bilities can be expected to increase with program size,
the detection of vulnerabilities becomes even more
important for larger systems.
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Abstract—During the past decade, the international community 
has witnessed several attacks on forms of mass transportation 
such as train stations and subways. The Department of 
Homeland Security requested that we develop methods to assess 
the security of mass transit in order to mitigate the vulnerability 
of the nation’s public transportation systems. We present a 
methodology to quantify the impact of imposing screening on 
mass transit, which considers both security and delays incurred 
on the traveling public. We demonstrate the approach through a 
case study, the Fairfield Metro Station in Fairfield, Connecticut. 
Our results indicate that rigorous aviation-style screening will 
slow the flow of passengers drastically. We also show how to use 
the approach to identify where faster screening technologies can 
improve passenger throughput while ensuring security. The 
approach can thus be used to identify areas where investments in 
technology improvement would most effectively enhance security 
and convenience. 
Keywords-mass-transit; passenger screening; security; 
performance;  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Screening is critical to ensure the security of every mode of 
transit in the nation’s transportation infrastructure. Both 
aviation and port security employ screening to minimize the 
chance that airplanes and boats carry illegal or dangerous items 
and individuals. Domestic mass transit systems such as 
railroads and subways, however, cannot impose rigorous 
security procedures because the time incurred in screening will 
produce a noticeable drag on the smooth flow of large volumes 
of passengers. The inconvenience and high cost of screening 
rail and subway passengers is undesirable, however, in the past 
decade, these modes of transportation have been the targets of 
several terrorist attacks throughout the world [1]. Moreover, it 
is public knowledge that terrorist organizations such as Al-
Qaeda plan to perpetrate such attacks. Mass-transit may also be 
an attractive terrorist target because of the widespread attention 
and public fear such acts inspire. Therefore, although the 
screening delays inconvenience passengers and harm 
profitability, protecting people and assets remains a significant 
concern. This suggests that advances in the speed of screening 
technologies are necessary before such comprehensive 
screening can be implemented for mass-transit systems. 
Prevalent research focuses on the engineering of security 
technologies rather than exploring their performance. For 
example, Burgoon et al. [2] automate techniques to detect 
deceptive behavior in individuals at border crossings. Tambe 
[3] has applied game theoretic techniques to security problems, 
including screening of cars entering Los Angeles International 
Airport, scheduling Federal Air Marshals on flights with 
potentially dangerous passengers, and randomized Coast Guard 
patrols to detect terrorism and drug trafficking. Most of these 
works focus on how existing screening technologies can be 
used effectively to improve security. However, there is very 
little research [4] on whether these technologies balance 
security and performance when employed at checkpoints. 
Therefore, such screening can be reasonably employed only 
when the volume of passengers is low, such as at airports. They 
do not scale to mass transit systems, which usually experience 
extremely high volumes of traffic. Therefore, to enhance the 
security of mass transit systems through passenger screening, 
methods which assess both the security and performance of a 
checkpoint are needed to determine if specific design and 
technologies exhibit desired levels of threat detection while 
maintaining acceptable passenger throughput.  
This paper presents a methodology to quantify the security 
and performance of a screening checkpoint in terms of the 
security and performance metrics of its constituent 
technologies and their organizational layout. We demonstrate 
our approach using the case study of the Fairfield Metro 
Station, which is the first railroad station to be built in 
Connecticut in over 90 years. The methodology allows us to 
quantify the probability that a threat will be detected as it 
passes through the checkpoint, along with the degradation in 
passenger throughput caused by screening. Our results indicate 
that imposing rigorous aviation-style screening will slow the 
flow of passengers drastically. Therefore, unless screening 
technologies can be made faster they will be too cumbersome 
for mass-transit. Our approach can thus systematically identify 
checkpoint designs and technology improvements that can 
balance the security and performance concerns, to enable their 
use in securing the mass transit infrastructure.  
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 outlines the 
challenges in quantifying security and performance with an 
example. Section 3 proposes the modeling approaches. Section 
4 demonstrates these approaches. Section 5 summarizes lessons 
learned and offers suggestions for enhancements. Conclusions 
and future research are offered in Section 6. 
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II. PROBLEM FORMULATION 
This section describes the challenges in assessing 
performance and security of screening checkpoints for mass 
transit systems using the layout of the security turnstiles in the 
lobby of Fairfield Metro Center (FMC), as shown in Fig. 1 
Passengers arrive at the station at rate λ(t). This arrival process 
is a function of time because travelers rely on mass transit 
systems for their daily commute. Hence, higher volumes may 
be expected during the rush hour, with lighter traffic at other 
times. Next, the passengers walk down a hallway to insert their 
ticket into one of three turnstiles for scanning, where a 
computer records the time and outputs the voided ticket before 
opening a gate to allow them to pass. The passengers then 
proceed to the platform of their departing train. 
To enhance passenger throughput, these turnstiles are 
placed side-by-side to create multiple parallel lanes. A 
passenger typically selects the turnstile with the shortest line. 
When passenger volume is high, however, the lines at all 
turnstiles are approximately equal. Therefore, we set the 
probability of selecting a particular turnstile equal (x1 = x2 = x3 
= 1/3). The process of inserting a ticket and passing through 
the turnstile requires approximately three seconds.  
Figure 1.  Fairfield Metro Center turnstile configuration. 
To understand the impact of introducing airport screening 
into mass-transit, Fig. 2 shows the primary components and 
key decision points in a simple checkpoint. These components 
could replace the turnstiles within FMC without requiring 
major modifications to the interior of the building. 
Figure 2.  Passenger screening checkpoint. 
In this layout, passengers arriving at the screening 
checkpoint must first check-in by providing their ticket and 
identification to a security officer. Next, they must divest 
themselves of their carry-on baggage and other personal items 
to be placed on a conveyor belt for x-ray screening. After this 
step, there are several decision points. First, a passenger may 
choose to undergo scanning by an Advanced Imaging 
Technology (AIT) machine or the older but more popular 
Walkthrough Metal Detector (WTMD). We assume that the 
probability of WTMD screening, denoted x1, is greater than 
that of AIT screening (1    ̅ ) because AIT exposes 
passengers to radiation and passengers believe that it generates 
revealing images. The second branch occurs because an 
attending officer has the authority to ask a passenger to 
undergo AIT scanning ( ̅ ), even if the passenger prefers 
WTMD. This leads to the third decision point because 
passengers have the right to opt-out of AIT and request 
alternative screening procedures (x3), involving a pat down 
inspection. Some passengers passing through WTMD forget to 
remove metal items and may also be asked to undergo a pat 
down (x4). AIT may also fail to ascertain the absence of 
concealed items, in which case a pat down will be requested 
(x5). Once passengers clear the screening stations, they proceed 
to retrieve their carry-on baggage, shoes, and other personal 
items. Subsequently, they will exit the screening checkpoint 
and continue to the platform from which their train will depart. 
The types of technologies in Fig. 2 include several implicit 
security policies employed at mass-transit checkpoints. They 
also reflect existing policies. For example, passengers’ 
identities are verified manually at check in. Such manual 
screening may be acceptable for high-speed rail, but will be 
extremely labor-intensive for subways. x-ray screening of 
carry-on baggage assumes that passengers will be required to 
submit their luggage for inspection. Finally, although WTMD 
and opt-out show limited effectiveness for detecting concealed 
threats, these alternative forms of screening continue to be 
retained because these forms may be necessary to respect the 
passengers’ privacy by offering them these choices.  
WTMD and opt out cannot be eliminated; in fact, a large 
fraction of passengers may prefer these slower forms, leading 
to underutilization of AIT and long lines for WTMD, requiring 
passengers to arrive for their trip earlier. Moreover, these 
alternative screening methods are laborious; suggesting that 
passenger preference for them will influence performance. It 
will also have a negative impact on security, because they have 
a lower probability of detecting concealed non-metal items. 
Thus, these technologies hinder the implementation of 
screening in mass-transit. Inclusion of AIT assumes that future 
mass-transit screening will consist primarily of this modern 
technology and that older less effective ones such as WTMD, 
opt-out, and unattended turnstiles will be phased out.  
In summary, the goal of modeling mass-transit screening is 
to assess the impact of passenger preference and the detection 
probabilities of the screening technologies on the security and 
performance of the screening checkpoint. A method to quantify 
tradeoffs between the security and performance will identify 
improvements that can reduce the waiting time while 
simultaneously ensuring the protection of people and assets. 
III. MODELING APPROACH 
This section describes our approach to quantitatively assess 
the impact of imposing screening on mass transit. Security and 
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 performance of a checkpoint are analyzed as a function of the 
organization of the screening technologies and flow of 
passengers through the machines and checkpoint.  
A. Security Analysis 
Security is defined as the probability that a screening 
technology or a checkpoint successfully detects a threat. We 
refer to our approach as architecture-based analysis because it 
expresses the checkpoint security in terms of the security of the 
screening stations comprising the checkpoint and the 
probabilistic flow of passengers through these stations. Let n 
denote the number of screening stations in the checkpoint. We 
represent the layout of these screening stations in terms of the 
one-step transition probability matrix of an absorbing DTMC 
[5] Pn×n, where pi,j denotes the probability that a passenger 
moves to station j after passing through station i. Without loss 
of generality, we assume that screening begins at station 1 and 
completes after station n. Thus, station 1 is designated as the 
initial state, and station n is the final or the absorbing state of 
the DTMC. The entry pn,n of P is set to 1.0. 
We augment the DTMC with two absorbing states D and F, 
where D corresponds to successful threat detection and the 
failure state F is reached if a threat escapes the checkpoint 
undetected. From each station i, a transition (i,D) with 
probability si is added, which is the likelihood that the station 
detects the threat. The original transition probability pi,j 
between stations i and j is revised to ̅	
	, , where ̅	  1 
	. This indicates that a passenger moves to station j only if 
station i does not detect a threat. Finally, a transition is added 
from station n to state D with probability pn,D = sn and to state F 
with probability 
,  ̅. Thus, the checkpoint fails if a threat 
is undetected at all stations the passenger visits. The process of 
composing the layout of the checkpoint with stations’ detection 
probabilities assumes that the transitions among the stations are 
independent and that the detection of a threat at any station 
implies that the checkpoint is successful. We refer to the 
resulting model as the ‘composite model’ because it offers an 
integrated representation of the layout of the checkpoint and 
the detection capabilities of the stations. 
Once the composite model is built, the following sequence 
of operations can be performed to obtain an expression, S, for 
the security of the checkpoint. 
• Set Pn,n=0. 
• Define diagonal matrix Mn×n with 	,	  ̅	. 
• Let Qn×n=M⋅P. 
• Compute Vn×n=(I−Q)-1. 
• Set ̅  ,. 
• Then   1  ̅. 
The matrix Vn×n contains visit statistics, where vi,j represents 
the mean number of times a passenger visits station j given that 
they enter the checkpoint at station i. Because an absorbing 
state can only be visited zero or one time during the screening 
of a passenger, it is a Bernoulli random variable with average 
probability of success given by vi,n ≤ 1.0. Thus, v1,n represents 
the probability of reaching the baggage pickup station starting 
from the check-in station with no threat detected. Therefore, 
v1,n multiplied by ̅, the probability station n fails to detect a 
threat, represents the probability the checkpoint fails to detect a 
threat .  Thus, checkpoint security is simply   1  ̅. 
B. Performance Analysis 
Traditional performance models [5] quantify the number of 
passengers screened per unit time. In this paper, we quantify 
performance as the percentage of passengers that can clear a 
security checkpoint before their train departs. Performance is 
commonly assessed using queuing theory, which is efficient 
and effective for such analysis. However, it requires restrictive 
assumptions that are often violated in practice. For example, 
the passenger arrival process needs to follow the well-known 
exponential distribution which implies a constant arrival rate. 
Passenger arrivals at mass transit, however, may not follow the 
exponential distribution. Passenger arrivals will exhibit 
temporal variations, often peaking during the rush hour, and 
waning at other times. Analytical queuing models cannot 
flexibly characterize such variations, and hence, cannot 
produce accurate estimates of screening performance. 
We develop a simulation model to consider time-varying 
trends in passenger arrivals. In this approach, passengers can 
arrive at a checkpoint consisting of n screening stations 
according to an arbitrary stochastic process λ(t). Similar to the 
security model, the one-step transition probability matrix P of 
the DTMC controls the flow of passengers among stations, 
which is determined by the checkpoint layout and the decision 
probabilities X. The vector µ, with element µi represents an 
arbitrary service time distribution describing the wait time of a 
passenger at station i. We denote m as the total number of 
passengers that will arrive at a checkpoint for a particular train. 
Fig. 2 shows the steps of the simulation procedure: 
• Step 1 simulates the vector of arrival times Ta 
according to the arrival process [6]. 
• Step 2 enqueues all m passengers at station one within 
the checkpoint. 
• Step 3 checks the completion time of the passenger at 
the front of each queue 1 ≤  ≤   to determine the 
passenger that moves next. 
• Step 4 removes this next passenger k from the front of 
queue i. 
• Step 5 determines the station j to which passenger k 
moves after finishing at station i according to the 
transition probability matrix P. 
• Step 6 tests if the destination station j is an absorbing 
station. 
• Step 7 simulates 

, the time at which passenger k will 
depart station j as follows. If there are no other 
passengers at station j, the completion time of the 
passenger is simply the time at which they completed 
service at station i, 	 , plus the randomly generated 
time sampled from µj for the time spent waiting at 
station j. However, if other passengers are at station j 
the completion time of passenger k is the randomly 
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 generated time sampled from µj plus the completion 
time of the passenger at the end of queue j. 
Figure 3.  Checkpoint simulation procedure. 
• Step 8 enqueues passenger k at the end of queue j and 
returns to Step 3 to determine the next passenger to 
move. 
• Step 9 records  , the time passenger k departs the 
checkpoint after having completed screening. 
• Step 10 checks to see if all m passengers have departed 
the checkpoint and returns to Step 3 if passengers 
remain. If no passengers remain, Steps 11 and 12 
terminate the simulation and compute performance 
metrics of the checkpoint, which are described below. 
By tracking the vector of passenger arrival times  
〈, … ,   〉, the times at which passengers depart their present 
screening station 	 , and the vector of times at which the 
passengers depart the screening checkpoint   〈 , … ,   〉, it 
is possible to calculate the number of passengers at each station 
at time t and the number of passengers in the checkpoint at time 
t. We can also determine the time spent in the queue by 
computing the difference    for each passenger and then 
plot completion times as a function of the arrival times. We 
compute the fraction of passengers that miss their train because 
they fail to pass through the checkpoint in a timely manner. 
IV. ILLUSTRATIONS 
This section demonstrates the security and performance 
assessment techniques through a series of examples. For both 
attributes, we initially demonstrate how to quantify the metric, 
followed by an illustration of how the sensitivity of the metric 
to various parameters of the layout and constituent technologies 
can be analyzed. 
A. Security Analysis  
This example quantifies the security of the station layout 
shown in Fig. 1, using the transition matrix P in Table I, where 
element (i,j) denotes the probability that a passenger moves to 
station j, upon the completion of screening at station i.  
TABLE I.  TRANSITION PROBABILITIES AMONG STATIONS  
i\j c x a o w P 
(c) Check-in 0 1. 0 0 0 0 
(x) x-ray 0 0 ̅ " ̅̅# ̅# x1x2 0 
(a) AIT 0 0 0 x5 0 ̅$ 
(o) Opt-out 0 0 0 0 0 1. 
(w) WTMD 0 0 0 x4 0 ̅% 
(p) Pickup 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Here xi correspond to the decision points described in 
Section II. The sequence of matrix operations from Section 2 
produces the following expression for checkpoint security. 
  1  &# " #̅' ̅( ̅) " ̅ " ̅̅#1  $ "
$*̅%̅' ̅( ̅ " 1  % " %̅%̅' ̅( ̅+,̅-. (1) 
Equation (1) expresses checkpoint security in terms of the 
decision points and detection probabilities of the stations. Thus, 
it is possible to evaluate checkpoint security for different types 
of threats and decision probabilities. For example, when a 
passenger conceals an object under clothing, the check-in, 
carry-on baggage x-ray machine, and baggage pickup stations 
have no chance of detecting this threat. Hence, sc, sx, and sp are 
set to 0. AIT will be the most effective at detecting this hidden 
threat, followed by manual screening at the opt-out station, 
while the WTMD will exhibit the lowest probability of 
detection. Thus, the securities of these three stations are set to 
sa=0.9999, so=0.99, and sw=0.9 to reflect their relative 
effectiveness. We set the probabilities of the five decision 
parameters to nominal values shown in Table II. 
TABLE II.  DECISION PARAMETERS 
(i) Decision Probability (xi) 
(1) Passenger selects WTMD 0.90 
(2) Officer allows WTMD 0.85 
(3) Passenger opts-out of AIT 0.30 
(4) WTMD passenger undergoes pat down 0.10 
(5) AIT passenger undergoes pat down 0.05 
 
Table II indicates that most passengers prefer and are 
allowed to undergo WTMD screening. Approximately 30% of 
passengers selected for AIT screening opt out. Furthermore, 
one in ten passengers screened by WTMD will also be 
screened manually, but only one in twenty passengers going 
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 through AIT require manual screening. These values are 
chosen solely for the sake of illustration. In practice, detection 
and transition probabilities may be determined from 
measurements made in transportation security laboratories and 
operational environments. For these parameters, Equation (1) 
computes that the threat detection probability is 0.9306. This 
illustrates that even though the AIT machine can detect threats 
with a higher probability, passenger preference for WTMD can 
significantly lower checkpoint security. 
Realistically, the detection probabilities of certain 
technologies cannot be improved beyond a certain threshold. 
For example, WTMD may have inherently low detection 
probability for most concealed, non-metal threats. Thus, 
Equation (1) suggests that an alternative method to improve 
security is to boost the probability that passengers select 
modern screening technologies. We thus analyze the sensitivity 
of checkpoint security to decision parameters using Equation 
(1). These parameters include the probability that a: (i) 
passenger selects WTMD (x1); (ii) security officer allows a 
passenger to undergo WTMD screening (x2), and (iii) 
passenger selected for AIT screening opts-out (x3). These 
probabilities were varied individually in the range (0,1), while 
holding all the other parameters at their values in Table II.  
Fig. 4 illustrates that a significant improvement in 
checkpoint security could be obtained by eliminating the 
possibility passengers choose WTMD (x1 = 0), which increases 
detection probability to 0.9999 (4 nines). A strategy that selects 
every passenger wishing to undergo WTMD for AIT screening 
increases detection probability to 0.9972 (2 nines) [7] while 
eliminating passenger opt out shows the smallest improvement 
of 0.9311. This analysis quantitatively confirms that passenger 
preference for WTMD over AIT lowers checkpoint security 
significantly. Therefore, passenger aversion to AIT must be 
decreased, which may be achieved using two possible 
strategies. The first approach is to mitigate health and privacy 
concerns through public education. A second method is to 
select more passengers for AIT screening (decreasing x2), to 
create a learning effect through passenger familiarity. 
Figure 4.  Sensitivity of security to decision parameters. 
B. Performance Analysis 
This example compares the performance of the current 
turnstile configuration in Fig. 1 with the rigorous passenger 
screening checkpoint in Fig. 2 using the simulation model. We 
consider m=100 passengers arriving for an 8:00am train 
according to a normal distribution with mean µ = -20 and 
standard deviation σ = 6. The mean indicates that the 
passengers arrive on an average 20 minutes prior to the 
departure of the train, while the standard deviation 
accommodates passengers arriving more conservatively, 30 
minutes or more in advance of the departure time. It also 
accounts for late and seasoned passengers who arrive just 
minutes before departure. According to these parameters, 
approximately 99% of the passengers will arrive sometime in 
the interval µ ± 3σ = (7:22am,7:58am). Although we use the 
normal distribution for illustration, it can be determined 
empirically based on the data collected by the turnstiles while 
stamping tickets. 
We assume that 80 passengers (µh = 80) can walk down the 
hallway leading to the turnstiles per minute, passengers get in 
line at one of the three turnstiles with equal probability (xi = 
1/3, i = {1, 2, 3}), and the time required for the computer to 
read and stamp the ticket follows an exponential distribution 
with an average time of 3 seconds, or twenty passengers per 
minute (µt = 20). The decision parameters of the passenger 
screening checkpoint are set to the values in Table II, while 
Table III provides the service rates of the passengers per 
minute for each station in the security checkpoint. 
TABLE III.  CHECKPOINT STATION RATE PARAMETERS 
(i) Station Rate (µi) (i) Station Rate (µi) 
(h) Hallway 80.0 (o) Opt-out 3.0 
(c) Check-in 6.0 (w) WTMD 4.0 
(x) x-ray 4.0 (p) Pickup 5.0 
(a) AIT 7.5   
 
Fig. 5 shows the results of a single experiment. The first 
passenger arrives approximately 35 minutes early, while the 
last passenger arrives just five minutes before the train departs. 
We fed the same sequence of arrival times to the simulation 
models of both the turnstile and screening checkpoint. The 
completion times under the turnstile model indicate that 
passengers quickly pass through and continue on to the train. A 
small slowdown can be seen slightly after 7:40am. The arrival 
distribution reaches its maximum at that time causing many 
passengers to arrive about twenty minutes before departure 
waiting at the turnstiles. However, the maximum wait time 
never exceeds 1 minute and no passengers miss the train. 
Under the screening checkpoint model, however, the last 
passenger clears the checkpoint over an hour after the train 
departure and only 40 of the 100 passengers can clear the 
checkpoint to board the train. 
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 Figure 5.  Comparison of turnstile and screening completion times. 
The difference between the arrival and wait time grows 
because the time needed for passengers to clear the checkpoint 
is greater than their arrival rate. This is consistent with a well-
known tenet from queuing theory [5], which states that the 
queue will be bounded only if arrival rate at the checkpoint is 
greater than its service rate. This property is not satisfied 
because the time-varying arrival process peaks at 20 minutes 
prior to the train’s departure. 
Fig. 6 shows the length of the line at the check-in station as 
a function of time, revealing that this check-in desk is the 
bottleneck. The arrival rate at 7:30am is not sufficiently high 
for the queue to grow unbounded. However, the queue begins 
to grow in the interval between 7:30am and 7:35am because 
passengers begin to arrive faster than they can be checked in. 
The increase in the queue length accelerates in the time interval 
(7:35am,7:45am) since the normal distribution characterizing 
passenger arrivals peaks at 7:40am. As the rate of arrival 
decreases in the interval (7:45am, 7:50am), the queue length 
levels off. However a delay with one passenger at 7:50am 
causes the queue to grow yet again. After 7:55am, all 
passengers have arrived and the queue empties at an 
approximately constant rate. 
Figure 6.  Passenger check-in queue length. 
The bottleneck created by the check-in desk suggests that 
manual verification of passengers’ identities is infeasible. 
Moreover, as noted earlier, introducing additional check-in 
stations is not feasible because of its cost. Thus, in order to 
avoid eliminating identity verification, faster technologies such 
as biometrics can be used. An experiment which removed the 
check-in station from Fig. 1 and allowed passengers to proceed 
directly to the baggage station shifted the bottleneck to the 
baggage station, suggesting that baggage scanning also needs 
to be expedited.  
The results of the above experiment revealed that imposing 
rigorous aviation security screening on mass-transit could 
create serious delays. Next, we demonstrate how the approach 
could be used to quantitatively compare the impact of 
improvements in individual stations. Usually, a single 
simulation experiment does not provide metrics with sufficient 
accuracy, so it is customary to compute the average metrics 
over several runs. We thus repeated the simulation with the 
station parameters in Table III 10,000 times, which indicated 
that on an average 34 passengers (approximately one third) can 
be cleared before the train departure. Having established this 
baseline, we next doubled the completion rate of each station in 
Table III one at a time and estimated the average number of 
passengers that would be cleared before departure. Table IV 
reports the results of this analysis for each station in the 
checkpoint and ranks the improvements according to the 
increase in the number of passengers that make their train. 
TABLE IV.  SENSITIVITY OF STATION PERFORMANCE 
Station Increase Rank Station Increase Rank 
Check-in 2.298 1 Opt-out 0.067 6 
x-ray 0.377 2 WTMD 0.290 3 
AIT 0.170 5 Pickup 0.226 4 
 
This analysis quantitatively confirms that accelerating 
check-in would produce the greatest improvement in passenger 
throughput followed by the x-ray machine, WTMD, and pickup 
stations respectively. Examining Fig. 2, all passengers must 
pass the check-in, x-ray, and pickup stations, potentially 
creating bottlenecks. Intuitively, Table III might suggest that 
the x-ray machine is the biggest bottleneck because it can 
service only four passengers per minute. The simulation results, 
however, indicate that the check-in desk creates the greatest 
slowdown because it is the first one in the network of stations. 
This causes the long line in Fig. 6 suggesting that the earlier 
stations are more critical to checkpoint performance. 
Improvements in WTMD rank higher than AIT because a 
larger percentage of the passengers will prefer and ultimately 
undergo WTMD inspection. AIT ranks higher than opt out for 
similar reasons. Substituting the probabilities from Table II into 
the transition matrix in Table I indicates that on an average 76 
of the 100 passengers go through the WTMD, while the AIT 
station and opt-out stations are visited by 19 and 5 passengers 
respectively. Thus, the criticality rankings given in Table IV 
are influenced by the service rates of the stations given in Table 
III and the average number of passengers visiting a station. The 
approach can therefore quantify the impact of each station on 
the performance of the checkpoint despite these complex 
factors influencing a station’s importance. 
V. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
This section offers policy recommendations based on our 
observations and lessons to improve security and balance 
performance for mass-transit screening. Specifically:  
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 • Introducing aviation-style screening checkpoints into 
mass-transit could dramatically slow passengers 
causing several passengers to miss their train. 
• Including alternative technologies like WTMD and opt 
out can significantly lower security. 
• Increasing passenger acceptance of AIT will offer the 
highest improvement in security. 
• Technologies to verify passengers’ identity and screen 
baggage must be accelerated. 
These lessons suggest that, to make mass transit screening 
effective and efficient, older screening methods such as 
WTMD and opt out must be phased out by increasing 
acceptance of AIT. Improved education to mitigate health and 
privacy concerns and selecting a larger number of passengers 
for AIT screening to increase their familiarity may accelerate 
this acceptance. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
This paper presents techniques to quantify the security and 
performance of passenger screening checkpoints and applied 
them to assess the impact of imposing screening on mass-
transit. The results reveal that the performance of screening 
technologies must be improved and passenger aversion to 
newer and faster technologies must be addressed to ensure the 
feasibility of screening for mass-transit. Our future research 
will enrich the security and performance assessment 
techniques by developing sophisticated modeling capabilities. 
For example, the model may be enhanced to incorporate batch 
or grouped arrivals of passengers, such as a family traveling 
together. To enhance the scalability of the approach and 
improve the accuracy of the metrics, more efficient data 
structures will be explored. We will use these enhanced 
simulation techniques as the basis of an optimization 
framework to identify investments in technology improvement 
offering the greatest improvements in security and 
performance. 
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Abstract—In response to the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office’s 
(DNDO) BAA 09-102 Passport Systems, Inc. of Billerica, MA has 
developed and tested a prototype system of networked portable 
spectroscopic radiation detectors designed to improve the 
detection, localization, and identification of potential radiological 
threats.  A system of this nature is primarily targeted to 
situations where it is not feasible to direct traffic through portal 
radiation detection systems, e.g. large events, search team 
objectives, etc.  The capability to intelligently network individual 
portable detectors and fuse their data using advanced algorithms 
and COTS hardware has been shown within this program to 
significantly increase the effectiveness of an assortment of 
portable radiation detectors in a variety of NORM (naturally 
occurring radioactive material) backgrounds.  An overview of 
current work will be provided in two parts: 1) A review of the 
system design, including trade space analysis, of both the 
hardware and algorithmic components; and 2) Presentation of 
data and results to date focusing on the improvement afforded by 
the networked data fusion 
Keywords-component; Networks, Nuclear Physics, Intelligent 
Systems, Decision Support Systems, Radiation Detectors, System 
Analysis & Design, Gamma-Ray Spectroscopy, Distributed 
Tracking, Distributed Algorithms, Signal Detection, Maximum 
Likelihood Estimation, Scintillation Detectors 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The use of human portable radiation detectors (HRPLs) has 
become more common in recent years among first responders, 
customs agents, and HAZMAT teams, in addition to their 
traditional use by radiological search teams, to aid in their 
mission to ensure public safety.  Such a trend is expected to 
continue considering the ongoing and increasing specter of the 
use of radiological materials for terrorist threats. 
Interest in the use of these devices can be further illustrated 
by the fact that the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) 
has devoted considerable resources for research by various 
companies to develop man-portable Intelligent Personal 
Radiation Locators (IPRLs) capable of detecting, measuring, 
locating, and identifying radiological threats.  As capable and 
useful as each of these devices either is, or is expected to be, 
their effective range is still limited by their small form-factor 
and the basic physics governing the detection of radiation. One 
method by which the performance of man-portable radiation 
detectors can be enhanced in an operational setting is through 
the networking and fusion of data from several devices in a 
localized region-of-interest.  With multiple devices all sharing 
data, a team of operators can leverage that integrated collection 
of devices to increase overall system sensitivity (through total 
increased detector volume)  and also to enable new capabilities 
which emerge from the distributed nature of the detector 
network (e.g. source localization). 
By networking radiation detectors, not only would their 
joint, integrated performance be expected to surpass that of the 
individual detectors for sensitivity and coverage, but the 
networked system would effectively become a new tool to 
solve challenges not addressed by current technology.  Portal 
radiation monitors, despite some limitations, have become 
useful equipment at locations where traffic can be funneled 
through a small area – such as major ports and border 
crossings.  However, in situations where such restrictions are 
not possible, such as at major events or within urban cores, a 
networked system of small, unobtrusive radiation detectors 
utilized by a team of operators could provide for the detection, 
localization and identification of potential radiological threats 
in those less controlled environments. 
With such reasons in mind DNDO issued BAA 09-102 
Advanced Technology Demonstration (ATD) for Intelligent 
Radiation Sensor System (IRSS) for the purpose of 
demonstrating the feasibility of a cost-effective system of 
networked radiation detectors designed from COTS and OEM 
components and using advanced data fusion algorithms to 
make optimal use of the data from those networked detectors. 
This program was focused on algorithm development, system 
integration, and prototyping to prove out the advanced 
technologies required to improve detection, localization, and 
identification of radiological sources using intelligently 
networked sensors. 
The IRSS program was a 2.5 year four-phase effort 
culminating in the ATD.  This paper summarizes the design, 
development, integration, and testing efforts of Passport 
Systems, Inc. during the execution of the IRSS ATD program. 
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II. SYSTEM OVERVIEW 
The proposed IRSS system overview is shown in Figure 1.  
The major components pictured are the detection device (DD), 
the base control unit (BCU), and the reach-back node.  For the 
purposes of the ATD the reach-back node capability to alert a 
central authority via a reach back network was not critical to 
demonstrating the effectiveness of the mesh network and was 
not tested.  The remaining system components are described 
below. 
 
Figure 1: IRSS System Overview 
A. Detection Device (DD) 
The detection device (DD) is a key system element of 
IRSS and, as highlighted in Figure 1, is comprised of two 
parts: 1) the detector augmentation device (DAD) and 2) the 
individual radiation detection device (IRDD).  The two 
devices are loosely coupled to maintain flexibility and 
upgradability.  The DDs themselves will automatically set up 
and maintain a wireless ad hoc mesh network, capable of 
automatic reconfiguration when necessary and providing data 
throughout the system, including to the optional BCU. 
The IRSS program was not a hardware development effort; 
however, it was determined early in the program that a true 
off-the-shelf radiation detector was not available that met the 
program requirements – including full spectroscopic 
capability, full interoperability with external devices (i.e. the 
DAD), and cost restrictions.  Therefore, a portable prototype 
device had to be designed and built to support the program 
requirements.  The IRDD consists of COTS and OEM 
components – including signal processing electronics, HV 
supply, battery, photo-multiplier tube, and scintillator crystal – 
that were integrated into a modular, portable system.  This 
modular design philosophy allows for plug-and-play of 
various sensors with unique characteristics (e.g. sensitivity and 
spectroscopic resolution) depending on operator need and 
component availability.  Indeed, during the course of the 
program it was determined that evaluation criteria could best 
be met through the availability of two detector sizes.  These 
are shown in Figure 2.  The active detection elements are both 
NaI(Tl) crystals, but two different sizes were utilized: 2”×2” 
and 1”×2” [dia. × length].  The modular design facilitated this 
mid-program decision with no schedule or design impact.  The 
design modularity, including the decision to use standard 
interfaces (e.g. USB) also facilitated the easy integration of 
external components – such as the differential GPS antenna 
visible in Figure 2 – when determined necessary during initial 
program testing. 
 
Figure 2: IRSS DDs.  The 2"×2" device is on the left and the 1"×2" device 
is on the right 
B. Base Control Unit (BCU) 
The BCU was designed as an optional component of the 
final system.  For the purposes of the ATD it provided the 
important capability for data storage and performance 
characterization as well as post-event evaluation.  The BCU 
was implemented using a Toughbook™ ruggedized laptop.  
For all intents and purposes the BCU was simply another node 
in the network – albeit one configured in this instance without 
an attached detector.  The BCU ran the same data collection 
and analysis software developed for the DDs.  The only 
difference was that an enhanced GUI interface was designed 
for the BCU to allow for improved monitoring and control 
during system testing activities. 
As part of an operational system a BCU provides a means 
for a local command authority to improve situational 
awareness, direct search teams, and enable the use of more 
complex algorithms in situations where the portable units are 
inadequate.  However, the BCU is not required for the network 
to function properly. The IRSS system was designed this way 
to ensure network robustness and avoid any single points of 
failure in the system. 
C. Detector Augmentation Device (DAD) 
In many ways the DAD was the focus of design work 
performed for this program.  The DAD was implemented by 
leveraging existing Android smartphone technology, and it 
provides all the functionality to interface with the IRDD and 
the operational user through an appropriate, configurable GUI.  
The DAD also provides a platform for all the communications 
and computation.   
The DAD is responsible for establishing and maintaining a 
robust ad hoc network.  This is accomplished using the native 
WiFi (IEEE 802.11b) capability on the smartphone and open-
source mesh network applications. Data is transferred around 
the network to all connected nodes – through multiple hops if This program in funded by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) under contract HSHQDC-09-C-
00123. 
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necessary – so that all current data is available to every node at 
each processing interval.   
The DAD is also the primary computation engine and hosts 
all of the advanced algorithms responsible for integrating 
shared data, estimating background and radiological source 
levels, and making decisions concerning the detection, 
localization, and identification of those sources.  All the data 
fusion and processing is done on every DAD separately using 
all the available data from the connected nodes.  This 
architecture has the advantage of ensuring that there is no 
single point-of-failure for the system.  Every detector calculates 
the best solution based on all the available information, 
whether it is data from only that detector or includes data from 
other near-by detectors. The significant computations required 
by the advanced algorithms, described below, were all carried 
out on the smartphone processor. 
III. IRSS ALGORITHMS 
The primary focus of the IRSS program was to demonstrate 
that networked systems are capable of improved performance 
compared to individual detectors and to quantify that 
performance advantage in a quasi-operational setting.  The 
development and testing of advanced data fusion algorithms 
which improve detection, localization, and identification of 
radiological sources using a networked system was the central 
program goal, despite the effort that went into the development 
of appropriate prototype detection units. 
The advanced algorithms fall into two separate 
development categories: background estimation and source 
estimation, each of which is described below. 
A. Background Estimation 
Background estimation is considered important for two 
reasons.  First, for the vast majority of time any given detector 
is measuring only NORM (naturally occurring radioactive 
material) background so it is important to understand and 
characterize it well to avoid false positive readings – 
particularly as NORM can vary significantly over short spatial 
intervals.  Second, if the background is measured with high 
certainty within an area then the system as a whole will be 
more sensitive to deviations, e.g. radioisotope source 
signatures, from that estimated background. 
The IRSS background estimation is a hybrid algorithm that 
provides a continuous estimate of the NORM radiation levels.  
The first part of the algorithm maintains a background map of 
measurements averaged across the full network of detectors.  
Using this map, an estimate of the local background is 
calculated along with a confidence based on the total 
measurement time for all detectors and distance of those 
measurements from the current location.  An example of this 
networked background mapping is shown in Figure 3, where 
three detectors mapped out the background radiation levels of a 
park in downtown Boston, MA.  The data, represented by an 
arbitrary, normalized count rate scale on the right, show that 
even over this small area the measured radiation levels vary by 
more than a factor of two.  In order to account for this 
background variation in the absence of background estimation, 
detection thresholds would have to be set near the highest 
levels to avoid false alarms and thereby miss detection of 
potentially small signals.  Such background estimations not 
only help real-time system performance but can also be saved 
for future reference and comparison. 
 
Figure 3: NORM background measurements using three networked 
detectors on the Rose Kennedy Greenway Park in Boston, MA 
When no background data exists, either from neighboring 
detectors or from previous measurements, the system must still 
estimate the local background.  This is done by comparing the 
estimated background spectrum to a linear superposition of 
basis functions determined through analysis of data collected in 
a number of background environments.  The contributions of 
the spectral components are constrained by count rates in 
sections of the spectrum (ranging from 60-3000 keV) that are 
not expected to contain source signals.  An example of 
background from various materials is shown in Figure 4 where 
the top six curves show both measurements and the scaled-
component fit for a number of different background 
environments with nearly a factor of ten variation in overall 
radiation levels. 
 
Figure 4: Scaled-component background measurement (solid lines) and 
fit (dotted lines) results.  The top six curves represent various 
backgrounds.  The bottom curve includes both 137Cs and 22Na sources 
The fit for the background cases in Figure 4 (dotted lines) is 
quite good.  The bottom curve illustrates the fit for a 
measurement including 137Cs (662 keV) and 22Na (511 and 
1275 keV) photopeaks.  Again the fit to the expected 
background levels is good and the deviation from that estimate 
at the expected source energies is clear.  
B. Source Estimation 
The goal of the source estimation algorithms developed for 
the IRSS program is to provide detection, localization and 
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identification of radiological sources.  Detection and 
localization of sources are achieved via a sampled Bayesian 
inference method while the identification functionality is 
implemented separately using a peak-finding and peak-
matching technique. 
In order to perform source detection and localization, the 
full probability density function (PDF) for the source is 
approximated   using the number of counts in each detector in 
the network and accounting for Poisson statistics and the 1/r2 
relation between count rate and source-to-detector distance.   
Visualization of this PDF is achieved through uniform 
sampling of the log-likelihood map.   Figure 5 shows an 
simulation of such a log-likelihood map where the log-
likelihood function has a maximum near the actual position of 
the simulated source.  Figure 6 illustrates the evolution of the 
PDF over time as increased statistics are gathered from all the 
detectors and the solution becomes more constrained.  
Detection is a result of comparing source hypotheses against 
null hypotheses – the likelihood ratio of the two (referred to as 
“fidelity”) needs to exceed a pre-determined threshold defined 
by required sensitivity and false alarm rates.  Source 
localization occurs naturally by identifying the spatial location 
of the peak likelihood.  For the IRSS program potential source 
motion (both direction and magnitude) are included in the 
hypothesis space so source tracking is also a natural result of 
the Bayesian estimation. 
During integration testing the application of the Bayesian 
inference algorithms showed a significant improvement over 
the individual detectors.  Figure 7 illustrates laboratory results 
from a four detector network of 1”×2” detectors at various 
radial distances (D) evenly distributed around an 8.9 µCi 137Cs 
source.  The source was exposed after 60 seconds and in the 
nearest three cases the network detected the source at least two 
times faster than any individual detector.  As the detectors 
moved farther away (D = 233 cm) the network still 
outperformed the individual detectors but the required 
detection threshold was not crossed during the time displayed 
in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 5: Log-likelihood map for sample scenario of one stationary 
radioactive source and nine regularly spaced detectors.  Actual source 
location at the red circle in the top plot 
 
Figure 6: Time evolution of the log-likelihood map as statistics are 
gathered and confidence and localization improve 
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Figure 7: Network detection results for a 4 detector network at various 
radial distances from a central 137Cs source.  Source was exposed at 60 
seconds.  Network results are in green.  Individual DD results are in blue 
These same data fusion algorithms have also been shown to 
enable detection of weak signals while maintaining a low 
system false alarm rate.  Typically, the overall false alarm rate 
for a set of N independent detectors would be N times the 
individual rate.  However, by fusing and processing all of the 
available data at each node the system false alarm rate can be 
kept low while maintaining sensitivity to weak signals.  Figure 
8 illustrates simulation results for a weak source moving at 
walking speeds (1.6 m/s) through a network of nine detectors 
with an inter-detector spacing of 21 m. 
 
 
Figure 8: Detection confidence for networked and non-networked 
detectors for a very weak moving source.  The red line is the average 
detection metric with the source present.  The blue lines are source absent 
trials.  The dashed red lines indicate ± 1 standard deviation 
The top and bottom plots in figure show the performance of 
the networked and individual detectors, respectively.  For both 
sets of trials the detection threshold was set to result in a false 
alarm rate < 1/day for the set of nine detectors using trials 
where the source is absent (blue lines).  The top plot shows that 
the networked detectors effectively integrate the weak signal 
counts across multiple detectors by applying the possibility of a 
moving source and thereby demonstrate a higher probability of 
detection.  In contrast, the bottom plot shows that when the 
individual detectors are taken separately a very low probability 
of breaking the detection threshold occurs before the source has 
moved through the detector grid. 
The source tracking capability is illustrated in Figure 9.  
Data was collected using a grid of 15 2”×2” detectors (shown 
as green circles) with an inter-detector spacing of 14 m.  A 
~500µCi 57Co source is moved through the center of the 
detector grid.  Figure 9 overlays the sampled hypotheses (blue 
dots) on the full PDF to illustrate that the sampling does a good 
job of tracking the full solution.  The red circle is the average 
position of all the hypotheses and is shown to track the source 
with reasonable accuracy.  It should be noted that each of the 
detectors is non-directional and provides no position estimation 
for a detected source.  It is only through fusion of distributed 
measurements from spatially dispersed detectors that the 
capability for source localization and tracking emerges. 
 
Figure 9: Live tracking experiment of a 57Co source.  Green circles are 
detectors.  Blue dots are source position hypotheses.  The red circle is the 
estimated source position and the white ellipse represents the positional 
uncertainty.  The colored background is the full PDF. 
C. Identification 
Spectroscopic data from the detectors is preprocessed into 
separate energy bins each of which are processed through the 
Bayesian inference engine independently to improve 
computational efficiency and allow for real-time processing on 
the smartphone platform.  These bins have been centered at the 
photopeak energies of expected radioisotopes, and their widths 
have been set by the detector resolution, to increase SNR for 
those potential signals.  One benefit of implementing the signal 
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processing in this way is that the detection process itself results 
in a coarse identification.  Detection in a given pre-defined 
energy bin implies the existence of that particular isotope.  This 
is only a coarse identification capability because there may be 
several isotopes that emit gamma rays at energies that are too 
close to be resolved by the IRSS detectors utilized herein.  In 
other words, the sources share an energy bin so there is some 
potential for ambiguity in the bin-based identification.  To 
resolve this ambiguity a high-statistics identification algorithm 
was also implemented. 
The high-statistics identification begins collecting data once 
detection has occurred and collects sufficient counts to develop 
unambiguous photopeaks in the gamma-ray spectrum.  The 
background is subtracted via an erosion method [1] and the 
signal confidence is calculated on a per channel basis. 
Confidence is compared to a predetermined, energy-dependent 
threshold and high confidence peaks are compared to a 
standard isotope library. 
This technique has several advantages over standard 
template matching, or deconvolution, techniques in that it is 
easier to add to the list of possible isotopes for identification.  It 
is sufficient to simply know the expected photopeak energy(s) 
rather than having to measure the full response function for 
each isotope-detector pair.  This was an important resource 
consideration for development of the prototype IRSS system. 
Additionally, peak-matching techniques do not require 
corrections for distortion in the low-energy Compton region, as 
does template matching, due to energy-dependent shielding 
effects. 
The network implementation of the high-statistics 
identification algorithm was done at the decision-level as 
opposed to the data level as in the detection/localization 
algorithm.  That is, the individual detector signal confidences 
were combined to get an overall system confidence.  This 
avoids the problem of diluting accumulated spectra with data 
from detectors that don’t see a source and thereby reducing 
overall SNR.  However, it also means that the identification 
function is dominated by the detector closest to the source 
Figure 10: Probability of correct identification vs. integration time for 
networked and individual detectors 
Figure 10 shows the probability of identifying an 8.9 µCi 
137Cs source as a function of integration time for measurements 
made by four networked 1”×2” detectors.  When the detectors 
are equidistant from the source there is a performance increase 
compared to that of an individual detector, but that advantage 
quickly drops as three of the detectors are moved further from 
the source. 
IV. PROGRAM STATUS & CONCLUSIONS
Passport Systems, Inc. has completed the IRSS ATD 
program as of June 1, 2012.  Forty-four prototype detectors (22 
each of the types shown in Figure 2) capable of sharing data 
through an ad hoc wireless network were designed, built, 
tested, and delivered to DNDO for the ATD, as were two 
BCUs.  Advanced algorithms were designed and implemented 
to fuse and exploit the networked data, demonstrating increased 
performance in detection, localization, and identification of 
potential radioactive isotopic sources.  The program has 
demonstrated the utility and feasibility of a robust system of 
man-portable networked radiation sensors using COTS/OEM 
components.  Both government and Passport analyses of data 
collected at SRNL (Savannah River National Laboratory) 
during Phase IV characterization and evaluation activities are 
on-going. 
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Abstract—We design and implement a hyper-focal imaging
system for acquiring iris images in the visible spectrum. The
proposed system uses a DSLR Canon T2i camera and an Okii
controller to capture videos of the ocular region at multiple focal
lengths. The ensuing frames are fused in order to yield a single
image with higher fidelity. Further, the proposed setup extends
the imaging depth-of-field (DOF), thereby preempting the need
for employing expensive cameras for increased DOF. Experiments
convey the benefits of utilizing a hyper-focal system over a
traditional fixed-focus system for performing iris recognition in
the visible spectrum.
I. INTRODUCTION
The texture of the iris is typically imaged in the near infrared
(NIR) spectrum. This is because the texture of dark-colored
irides is more easily discernible in the NIR spectrum rather
than the visible (RGB) spectrum. However, recent work has
explored the possibility of conducting iris recognition in the
visible spectrum using RGB images [3], [7], [12], [13], [15].
Iris recognition using RGB images is challenging for darker
irides due to the effect of melanin. Darker irides have a higher
concentration of melanin that absorbs most of the visible light
and the images appear dark due to the low power of the
reflected light. The effect of melanin decreases significantly
in the NIR spectrum thereby revealing textural patterns even
for darker irides [4]. Iridal information in visible spectrum can
be improved by using a controlled lighting setup to illuminate
the structure of the iris and producing sufficient reflected light
towards the imaging camera. However, due to the required
higher intensity illumination for visible light iris captures,
especially for darker eyes, the placement of such illuminators
should be carefully studied in order to avoid user discomfort.
Quality of an acquired iris image is a very important metric
that directly affects the performance of an iris recognition
system. Image focus plays a predominant role in estimating
image quality [2], [6]. Better focused images can be only
acquired at the time of image acquisition and cannot be easily
compensated for once the process is complete1. A higher focus
value is preferred for better quality images. Camera’s depth
of field (DOF) is defined as physical depth of the volume
being imaged that appears in-focus on the capture image.
Another important factor in iris image quality is shutter speed,
1Exceptions include Lytro camera (https://www.lytro.com/camera#) and
Throwable panoramic ball camera (http://jonaspfeil.de/ballcamera)
as faster shorter exposures result in less motion blur. Yet the
corresponding reduced exposure times require larger camera
apertures that, in turn, reduce DOF and cause the image to be
partially out of focus. To make things worse, during RGB iris
acquisition, the illumination level has to be high in order to
better expose texture of darker irides, which in turn requires
either longer exposure times (leading to motion blur) or larger
apertures which lead to shallower DOFs, or both. Meanwhile,
simply increasing the intensity of illuminator may result in
subject discomfort and is not practical. The aforementioned
opposing requirements create further challenges for visible
light iris recognition.
In this paper, we propose an imaging method using a com-
bination of focus bracketing with lateral white LED lighting as
solution to overcome the aforementioned RGB iris exposure
and depth of field problems. A traditional approach to increase
the DOF is to increase the f-number of the lense. However, as
mentioned earlier, increasing the f-number decreases the optics
aperture and requires longer exposure time or higher illumi-
nation intensity. To better expose irides, especially those with
heavy pigmentation, we initially allow for larger apertures. As
a result, a single frame of the ocular area will be only partially
in-focus. Next, multiple captures of the same ocular area are
takes in rapid succession but each at a slightly different focal
plane (focus bracketing technique), and the stack of images is
then fused to improve overall focus. Focus bracketing, also
known as hyper-focal imaging, is a technique to obtain a
single sharp, high DOF image from a series of images captured
at varying focal distances. In this paper, we demonstrate the
benefits of this technique for RGB ocular biometrics.
Earlier work on overcoming the focus problem include [11],
[14], [16] that use wavefront coding to achieve extended DOF
at a fixed focus. In [10], the authors use specular reflection
of the IR-LED illuminator to rapidly assess the focus of a
sequence of frames acquired at varying focal lengths and select
the best focused frames for iris recognition. In [5], the authors
use auto-focus feature based on lens design and self-alignment
to position the iris in the camera’s depth of field. The system
in [4] maximizes the spectral power in the middle and upper
frequencies of the 2D Fourier spectrum of the acquired images
in order to select the best frame for iris recognition.
In this paper we introduce a novel iris imaging platform
designed to record RGB iris details in a video format by
1
Homeland Security Affairs, Supplement 6, Article 5 (April 2013) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
employing hyper-focal imaging and lateral white LED lighting
resulting in a sharp, well exposed, and high DOF image
of the eye. This overcomes the problems associated with
capturing dark irides in visible light. A comparative study
between single-focus and hyper-focal images is performed to
demonstrate the positive effects of hyper-focal imaging in the
context of visible spectrum iris biometrics.
II. DATA ACQUISITION
A. Platform Design
We designed a hyper-focal video recording platform using
focus bracketing with 30 FPS 1080p HD video. A novel
technique was developed to adjust the focus of the camera
lens automatically in real time by programming an Okii FC1
Arduino-based follow focus controller (Okii Systems LLC,
Apex, NC) to communicate with the Canon T2i dSLR’s
internal motorized focus mechanism through the camera’s
USB port. The Okii controlled Canon T2i is mounted on a
tripod setup while the subject uses a chin rest to face the lens
and its attached lighting element (Figure 1). A single focus
stack acquisition takes around 0.5 seconds at full HD frame
rate of 30 fps. Average distance from the camera to the subject
is 1.5 ft. The camera is operated at F number F5.6, an exposure
time of 1/125 sec, and ISO of 800.
Fig. 1. The image acquisition setup that was adopted in this work. The
images are acquired in a cooperative environment. Future work will include
relaxing some of the acquisition constraints in order to obtain images from
less cooperative subjects.
B. Optics and illumination devices
A modified Digi-Slave Flex Ring 6400 is used for illumi-
nation. This macro light is equipped with 64 oversized white
LEDs, 32 LEDs in the ring (center light with 11 cm outer
diameter and 7 cm inner diameter) and two flexible arms
(modified to extend 50 cm long to the side of each eye) with
16 white LEDs on each pad (Figure 2). The light is used as
in continuous mode to avoid photic startle. A polarizing filter
film is applied to each side light pad for subject comfort. In
this experiment we used only side lights for illumination and
the center ring was turned off. Camera lens consisted of an
EFS 50 mm, f/2.8 macro lens and an OKII micro controller.
C. Okii micro controller
Okii micro controller is a programmable Aurdino-based
USB follow-focus host device connected to the camera. It
is powered by Atmel Atmega328P that runs at 8MHz. The
programmed device works on the principle that, when two
focal points are saved, the speed of movement of the lens
between these two focal points is determined by the number
of steps required to move between these two focal points.
The controller may be operated in small, medium and large
focus step modes that correspond to the rate of motorized
focus change introduced in the camera lens. Medium setting
was used in this acquisition protocol. A button on the OKII
controller is programmed to move the lens from a focal plane
around subject’s tip of the nose, which is defined as point A,
to the vicinity of the ear, which is defined as point B.
Fig. 2. Lateral LED illumination setup
III. DATA COLLECTION PROTOCOL
Data was collected from 46 volunteers based on IRB proto-
col 11-57e. Image stacks were collected over two sessions
for each subject with a time gap of 45 minutes between
sessions. Analysis was performed based on video recordings
captured in session-1 and session-2. The data is acquired in
a dark environment to avoid external artifacts. Lateral LED
lighting pads were used to illuminate the iris as shown in
Figure 1. It is hypothesized that this lighting configuration
and location provides good textural information since the
3D iris structure casts more shadows at such incident angles
compared to frontal illumination thus accentuating the iridial
textures. Furthermore, the indirect lighting angle alleviates
subject discomfort despite the proximity of the pads to the
iris. Subjects were asked to place their head on the chin rest
while data collection was in progress. Note that this study
was conducted under controlled conditions using cooperative
users in order to first establish the benefits of hyper-focal
imaging. Future work will explore the use of a less controlled
acquisition environment. Each recording included movements
of focal point from tip of the nose (point A) to end of the
ear (point B) labeled as round 1, and back (from B to A)
labeled as round 2. The total recording time is one second
(0.5 sec for each round). The acquired video at the rate of
30 fps provides sufficient number of frames for hyper-focal
processing in one complete pass. In each session, subjects were
asked to look straight at the camera during the recordings. A
sequence of frames was extracted from the captured 1-second
clip 2. From the extracted frames, we used only 8 frames per
direction i.e. 8 in the forward direction from A to B) and 8 in
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fused samples, one pertaining to the forward direction and one
pertaining to the reverse direction. The analysis is performed
using two fused samples from session-1 and two fused samples
from session-2 for each subject.
IV. IMAGE FUSION USING HELICON FOCUS
A sequence (focus stack) of 8 frames obtained at varying
focal planes is fused to result in a sharp, high DOF hyper-focal
image. The 8 consecutive frames are manually selected from
the acquired video based on the prototype shown in Figure 3.
Fig. 3. Fusion prototype using the hyper-focal acquisition system
The Helicon focus software (Helicon Soft Ltd., Kharkov,
Ukraine) [1] uses information from the sequence of images in
the focus stack and produces a single hyper-focal image by
fusing the sharper areas from each frame while adjusting for
subtle movement and scaling aberrations across focal planes.
Helicon focus software provides two options for focus stack
fusion. Method A computes fusion weights for each pixel
based on their contrast information, and all the corresponding
pixel weights are averaged across the sequence of frames.
Method B uses the sharpest pixels information and produces
a depth map for stack fusion. This method has an advantage
of overcoming halo effects across contrast edges. The focus
measure at each point is determined by the distribution of
pixels at a certain distance R from the point under considera-
tion. Smoothing is another fusion parameter determining how
smoothly the focus areas across stack captures are combined
in the final hyper-focal image. This software registers the input
images before applying the above mentioned methods. In our
study we used Method B with a radius of R=45 pixels and a
default smoothing value of 4. The exact method of registration
and matching are proprietary.
Figure 4(b)(d)(f) shows examples of hyper-focal fusion
using the Helicon focus software.
V. IRIS SEGMENTATION AND MATCHING
Ocular regions for left and right eyes were manually cropped
from every acquired face image. The original face image
had dimensions of 1088 × 1920 pixels and iris region in the
cropped ocular images had an average of 82 pixels across its
diameter. The final dataset has 184 iris images for each eye
corresponding to 4 fused samples per subject for 46 subjects.
These 4 fused samples are obtained over two sessions with
2 fused samples per session: one fused sample is generated
from frames in the forward direction (round 1) and the other
fused sample is generated from frames in the reverse direction
(round 2).
The red channel image is used for iris matching as this
is assumed to reveal maximum textural information due to
its proximity to the NIR spectrum. The iris images are seg-
mented by approximating the limbic boundary and pupillary
boundary as circles and searching for the largest gradient
values in circular Hough space. The upper and lower eye
lids are approximated with straight lines. More details of the
segmentation process can be found in [9].
Improperly segmented irides are visually determined and are
manually rectified. This is to avoid issues related to incorrect
segmentation that can affect the subsequent matching results.
Pupillary boundary for darker irides is virtually indistinguish-
able from the surrounding iris region in RGB and poses a
major problem for automatic segmentation. Segmented iris
images are unwrapped to a pseudo-polar rectangular grid
using Daugman’s rubber sheet model [4]. The gray scale
rectangular normalized image is converted to an IrisCode [4]
using Masek’s encoding method [9] that uses log-Gabor filters
in the Fourier domain and further quantization to convert
the filter response to a binary code known as IrisCode.
Normalized Hamming distance is used to measure the dis-
similarity between two IrisCodes. Thus, a lower match score
indicates a better match. Several match scores are generated by
computing the Hamming distance between one IrisCode and
horizontally shifted versions of the other and the least score is
selected as the final match score. This accounts for rotational
inconsistencies between the two iris images.
Figure 5 shows the result of segmentation and normalization
on a sample iris image.
VI. FOCUS MEASURE
A focus metric is used to compare the quality of the acquired
sequence of frames with their corresponding hyper-focal fused
image. We used a simple wavelet based focus metric [8] in
this study. It is noted that focus index of an image is highly
correlated with sum of its wavelet coefficients, where a higher
sum indicates better focus. Wavelet coefficients are generated
based on equation below, where I(X, Y) is the input image
and ψ is the basis function:














, i = {H,V,D}
Wavelet decomposition of image in the horizontal (H),
Vertical (V) and diagonal (D) directions is performed using
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(a) - Sequence 1 (b)
(c) - Sequence 2 (d)
(e) - Sequence 3 (f)
Fig. 4. Examples for individual frame sequences and corresponding hyper-focal fused images. Here, (a), (c) and (e) represent 3 sets of input frames. (b),




Fig. 5. (a) Original image (b) Segmentation output (c) Normalized image
and (d) corresponding mask image
Daubechies mother wavelet of order one. If is the mean of
the wavelet coefficients in all the directions resulting in our
focus metric. Figure 6 shows the focus values for individual
frames in the video sequence shown in Figure 4 (focus stack)
and the corresponding value for fused hyper-focal image. It is
evident that hyper-focal fusion yields a higher focus measure
for fused image compared to the input frames.
VII. EXPERIMENTS
We compared the performance of single focus and hyper-
focal images independently on the left and right eyes. In this
analysis we chose the middle frame (4th frame) from the 8-
frame sequence and generated iris match scores on the dataset.
Choosing the fused hyper-focal image for matching resulted in
Fig. 6. Focus measure for individual frames against the fused hyper-focal
image
a decreased EER compared to matching using only the middle
frame. Figure 7 shows the plotted ROC curves and Table I
shows the corresponding EER values for middle frame and
fused hyper-focal image matching.
























Left eye middle frame
Right eye middle frame
Fig. 7. ROC curves for left and right eye of Hyper-focal images and middle
frame from the stack of variable focus images
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TABLE I
ROC ANALYSIS FOR HYPER-FOCAL IMAGES AND MIDDLE FRAMES FROM




Left Eye 0.04997 0.1245
Right Eye 0.021588 0.096347
To illustrate the effect of focus of the captured image on
the iris match scores, box plots are shown in Figure 8.
For each subject, 8 frames are available in the first sequence
each of Session-1 and Session-2. Genuine match scores are
generated by matching all the 8 frames from first sequence
of Session-1 against all the 8 frames from the first sequence
of Session-2. Figure 8 shows the box plots of these genuine
scores along with the match score (red dot) for matching the
best focused frames in both the sessions and corresponding
match score (green dot) for fused hyper-focal images. It is
clearly evident as shown in Figure 8, that the genuine match
score for the fused hyper-focal image is much lower than that
of the middle frame, there by suggesting a better match.
Wilcoxon signed rank test [17] is used to demonstrate
the statistical significance of the improvement in genuine
match score when using hyper-focal image compared to single
focus images (middle frame). Table II shows the z-values
and the corresponding p-values for different scenarios. S1(S2)
stands for Session-1(Session-2) and R1(R2) stands for the
first(second) sequence.
TABLE II
STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE TABLE FOR HYPER-FOCAL IMAGE VS. BEST
FOCUSED IMAGE (WILCOXON TEST RESULTS)
S1R1 S1R1 S1R2 S1R2
vs vs vs vs
S2R1 S2R2 S2R1 S2R2
z-statistic 4.4166 3.2694 4.4603 4.6351
p-value <0.0001 0.0005 <0.0001 <0.0001
Values in Table II reject the null hypothesis that the genuine
match score of hyper-focal image is greater than genuine
match score for middle frame of the 8 selected frames.
Another scenario is considered where hyper-focal match score
is compared against the minimum possible match score for a
fixed focus frame. Assuming the basic assumptions for t-test to
be true, Table III shows the significance of hyper-focal images
in iris recognition.
TABLE III
STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE TABLE FOR HYPER-FOCAL IMAGE VS. BEST
MATCH SCORE USING A SINGLE FIXED FOCUS IMAGE
S1R1 S1R1 S1R2 S1R2
vs vs vs vs
S2R1 S2R2 S2R1 S2R2
t-statistic 2.3714 2.4330 2.7123 2.3448
p-value 0.0110 0.0095 0.0047 0.0117
Table III shows that genuine score for fused hyper-focal
image is lower(better) than the best possible genuine score for
fixed focus image scenario with a high statistical significance.
VIII. DISCUSSION
A sequence of 8 images captured in a fraction of a second
was used for fusion in our study. However, this number
depends on the native frame rate of the camera, 3D depth of an
eye, and also speeds of the motorized lens moving mechanism.
Higher native speed of the camera would ultimately reduce
the chances of observing motion blur and occlusions in image
acquisition. We used 1080p HD video recordings with 30 fps
instead of the regular burst mode full frame image captures
and used the lens’ internal focus motors for smoother lens
movements. This obviates the use of moving rails and external
motor-operated lens moving mechanisms. These traditional
mechanisms when operated at higher speeds might induce
vibration resulting in motion artifacts. Another instrumental
factor in our design is the use of side lighting making RGB
iris captures a possibility. Our statistical analysis and ROC
analysis clearly show that hyper-focal imaging performs better
than regular imaging. However, hyper-focal imaging technique
in conjunction with existing commercial technologies would
help in improving iris recognition rates.
IX. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we introduced a novel image acquisition
platform using hyper-focal imaging technique and side lighting
to acquire high quality images of iris in the visible spectrum
with greater DOF. Statistical analysis confirm, with high confi-
dence, that hyper-focal imaging systems produce better results
compared to fixed focus systems. In future we would like to
implement this technique to see the effect of imaging for on
iris-on-the-move systems. Using these high-resolution RGB
iris images a study on pigmentation and ethnicity assessment
using iris color information will be performed in the future.
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